Review of existing secret voting technologies
B.A.Makarov
Federal State Unitary Enterprise
“The Moscow Radio Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences”,
city of Moscow, Russia.
Nowadays worldwide four generations of secret voting technologies are used at realization of choices. Each generation of such technologies bases on its own concept.
First concept. First generation of secret voting systems
“Classic technology” of secret voting, which is already known for thousands years and is applied in the majority of the countries of the world, including Russia, bases on the concept of honest election committees. It is considered a priori, that all election committees as well as their members consist of honest people by definition. Therefore, the results of voting announced by them are definitive and aren’t called in question or discussed (in view of full uselessness). After the announcement of voting results an ordinary voter may only guess whether the official results of voting are adequate to the will of voters? And whether they are generally adequate?
“Classic technologies” and their numerous variants are characterized by the following attributes:
1. Practically full anonymity (in case of correct organization of voting technology), though in the world the variants of “Classic technology” are used allowing to open incognito of voters;
2. Less funds used;
3. Voting results are announced with some temporal delay after ending of the process of voting.
The main imperfection is low degree of protection from falsification of voting results. It is proved by numerous scandals connected with the facts of juggling and falsifications of voting results. Procedures of prescheduled voting, voting on “transfer” certificates and voting by mail are practiced by many countries of the world using secret voting technologies of the first generation. Even these three procedures give to election committees an immense field of activity for falsification of voting results.
Second concept. Second generation of secret voting systems.
Technologies of the secret voting based on using computer aided and automated systems with optical scanners, devices for input of punched cards or various sorts of smart-cards (magnetic, radio, etc.) and special software.
These systems are based on the concept of honest technical system, which is designed and made and loaded with a software by unknown persons, that is in the basis of the concept of such systems the principle of “honest” technical device is put which should be trusted by voters, because it allegedly honest and impartial.
These systems can be realized in two variants:
1. Summarizing voting results in real time scale, i.e. practically instantly after end of the voting procedure. It occurs in the case when the voter by himself puts the ballot into the input unit of appropriate technical device.
2. Summarizing voting results with some temporal delay.
In the first case this voting technology actually does not provide anonymity and voting actually is not secret. In the second case, when input of the ballots is carried out by members of election committee after ending of voting, anonymity exists but the degree of protection from falsification is very low.
Typical example of such system is State Automated System “Elections” that is gradually introduced in some regions of Russia. A imperfection such computer aided (automated systems) also are the large material and financial expenses not only on their creation, but also on operation, including expenses for search before each choices of possible(probable) hardware and program “bookmarks” intended for falsification of voting results.
Despite of it, in a number(line) of the countries the similar systems work in a real time scale and the results, received with their help, of voting admit final.
Third concept. Third generation of secret voting systems.
Electronic voting by means of Internet or other informational and communication network for data transfer. These technologies do not provide anonymity and despite application of modern hardware-software means and high technologies, have the lowest degree of protection from falsifications. Especially from “third persons”. The problem of personal authentication of voter isn’t solved. These technologies are mainly used for virtual increase of voters attendance percentage and quick summarizing of voting.
Secret voting systems of second generation with voting results summarizing in real time scale and systems of third generation do not correspond article 2.7 of the Declaration of criteria of free and fair elections, adopted by the 154th session of the Council of Interparlamentary Union in Paris dated March 26, 1994. This article says: “The right on secrecy of voting is absolute and may not be limited by anything”. This manifest is signed by the representatives of 114 countries of the world, including the Russian Federation.
Secret voting systems of the, second and third generations do not give to a voter any guarantees of honest polling of vote made by him. Actually they roughly break the right of person for being advised about the correct polling of his vote at summarizing voting results. These secret voting systems do not provide transparency of elections. Within the framework of these technologies voter can realize the active suffrage only partially. To the voter is given the right to take part in free elections corresponding the international democratic standards and to vote, but thus the voter is deprived from the right to control correctness and accuracy of voting results. This right according to the legislation is delegated (trusted) by the voter to election committees of various different levels, to electoral colleges, domestic and international observers, various sorts of automated and computer aided systems (for instance - State Automated System “ Elections ” in Russia) and so forth.
Besides, these abovementioned technologies of secret vote allow to conduct pseudo-direct election, not direct ones. Actually, while voting, elector puts the bulletin into the for voting directly for a candidate (or against all candidates), but into the technological process of votes counting is included the elective (counting) board or some technical device, and in some technologies both of them simultaneously. For example, in case of voting using scanners for voting ballots or voting with the help of Internet. At using these technologies voter is debarred from the process of control of votes counting in his selected variant of voting at counting the results of voting.
Fourth concept. Fourth generation of secret voting technologies.
Transparent secret voting technologies developed by Close Corporation “Magic Technologies” (Moscow, Russia), are based on the concept of retrospective control of correctness of polling votes by the voter himself. These technologies allow to realize various in ways, repeated, multilevel system of retrospective control of voting results not only in the level of local election committee but as well in the level of territorial (district) election committee, regional election committee, republic, state or nation-wide level. Using transparent technologies voter may realize his active suffrage completely. Realization of transparent secret voting technologies legislatively provides to the voter alongside with the opportunity to participate in democratic elections and to vote free the right and technical opportunity to check independently the result of polling of his vote at publication of voting results.
Legislation about elections based on full active suffrage allows to carry out honest elections.
Realization of transparent secret voting technologies in full volume gives to the voter the opportunity of realization of multistage control of voting results (in minimal volume - 3 stages of control, in maximal - 7 stages).
The basic regulations of transparent secret voting technologies in case of realization in minimal volume, are described in the following
publications:Nowadays secret voting technology is protected by 12 Russian Patents, patenting in other countries is also being performed.
During the parliamentary hearings that took place on December, 18, 2001 in the State Duma of Russia, devoted to discussion of the draft Federal Law # 125634-3 “About modifications and amendments to the Federal Law “About the fundamental guarantees of elective franchises and rights for participation in referendum of citizens of the Russian Federation”, transparent technologies of voting by secret ballots got a high appreciation and were called the technologies of the future.
For realization of transparent secret voting technologies in minimal volume in comparison with “Classic” technology it is necessary to carry out the following additional preparatory operations:
1. Printing of ballot forms for secret voting consisting of two (or more) identical parts by form or by sense, having punched or not punched tear. One of possible variants of the bulletin is presented in Appendix # 1 and the Appendix #2 (blank and filled forms of the ballot accordingly).2. On each of the parts of the ballot there is a place for the individual number of the ballot.
3. Individual identification numbers of the ballots are printed as separate documents with serial numbers from 0001 to 3300. Under the Russian Law about elections the quantity of voters of each local election committee may not exceed 3000 persons (and 10 % reserve).
For elimination of possible misunderstanding it is desirable to print the documents with individual identification numbers in the amount greater than the number of registered voters. These documents may be executed in kind of double (threefold) mark with tear line and holographic protection.
4. Voter, having presented identification card, is registered in the election committee and receives the complete set of ballots in the established form and undersigns for their receiving.
5. Voter by himself takes from the box the document with individual identification number. This document may also be sealed in envelope.
6. In polling cabin the voter carries out selection of the variant of voting and identically fills in all parts of the ballot.
7. Then he gives to the ballot the individual identification number.
8. According to the tear line he divides the ballot into parts, one part he retains, and the second (or the second and third) puts into the sealed box for voting.
9. After ending of voting election committee carries out polling of votes given for each candidate or against all candidates and also the ballots recognized void.
10. Thus at once is made and promulgated standard protocol ¹ 1 about voting results. In the protocol the number of votes given for each candidate, the number of ballots given against all candidates and the number of ballots recognized void etc. is indicated.
11. Then individual identification numbers of the ballots given for each of the candidates and also against all candidates and the number of the ballots recognized void are determined. Thus the procedure of sorting the numbers in ascending order is carried out. Then protocol ¹ 2 on voting results is made with indication (as an Appendix) of individual identification numbers of the ballots given for each candidate (voting topic), against all candidates and the number of the ballots recognized void. This protocol ¹ 2 is promulgated as the information open to the voters.
12. In case the voter finds any non-conformity of his variant of voting with the results published, he may within the term defined by the law at his own discretion appeal to the election committee (or to court), presenting his part of the bulletin remaining at him i.e. to carry out the retrospective control of voting results. If the voter wishes to keep incognito, he won’t appeal, but in this case he will as well know for sure that falsification, deliberate or unintentional, was made regarding his variant of voting.13. After consideration of all appeals final protocol ¹ 3 about voting results is published with mandatory indication (as an appendix) the files of individual identification numbers of the ballots.
Transparent secret voting technologies practically carry out summarizing of voting with temporal delay and gradual three-stage precise definition of voting results. It is their minus, but their doubtless plus is rigid control by the voters for polling of votes.
As to additional funds spent in comparison with “Classic” technologies, we shall carry out analysis of these additional expenses in the assumption at the local election committee are available the following means of office equipment:
a) Pen;
b) Paper;
ñ) Blank forms of reports on voting results;
d) Calculator.
In such case additional expenses will consist of the following components:
1. Printing the new form ballots.
2. Printing the documents with individual identification numbers of the ballots.
3. Formation of files and sorting of individual identification numbers of the ballots given for particular candidate, against all candidates and void ballots.
4. Printing these files for promulgation and protocol ¹ 2 about voting results.
5. Expenses connected with analysis of the voters’ appeals.
6. Repeated printing of corrected files of individual identification numbers of the ballots and their promulgation.
7. Filling the final variant of protocol ¹ 3 about voting results.
Let's consider in detail the components of these additional expenses:
Item 1. The expenses in comparison with “Classic” technology for the same purposes will not exceed 100%.
Item 2. The expenses for printing the documents with individual identification numbers are insignificant. These documents can be executed as paper sheets of size not more 3õ10 centimeters. If individual identification numbers of the ballots are carried out marks with holographic protection the expenses for manufacturing one mark will not exceed 0,03 USD.
Item 3. Formation of the file of individual identification numbers.
Three persons will cope with this task within 8 hours. In result there are tables, hand-written or printed using typewriter for promulgation of results (item 4). In volume they are 10-15 standard pages of A4 format (210õ297 mm), filled with columns of figures. The number of pages depends on the number of voters taken part in elections and the number of registered candidates. Naturally, solving of this problem becomes considerably simpler if computer, printer and laser scanner are used.
Item 4. Expenses connected with appeals.
The term for appeals can make 3-4 days. Structure of appeal commission includes 1-3 persons. The commission works in the presence of official observers from parties or candidates. Work of the observers is paid by the parties and candidates. If the voter is not satisfied with analysis of his appeal (application), he is given the motivated refusal and he can appeal to court.
Item 5. Repeated printing of corrected files of individual identification numbers of the ballots and their promulgation.
One person will cope with within one day. It is even faster if computer is available.
At the same time, the operation of sorting the files of individual identification numbers, printing these files and their updating can be carried out using one computer for 20-30 Local Election Committees. Thus, availability of computer in each Local Election committee is absolutely unessential. Additional expenses for realization of transparent secret voting technologies by the selective ballots listed in items 1- 6 may be counted up independently with consideration of the prices for goods and services in your region.
There is the variant of realization of transparent technologies focused on using special ballots, computer and typical hand-held laser scanner, with which the full processing of one ballot takes no more than 3 seconds. However, it is possible to use the project of introduction transparent secret voting technologies, developed by us, without employing any additional expenses and which allows to receive guaranteed additional financial receipts in the budget at once. Elections which are now carried out worldwide, may not be called other than profanation. Profanation in literal translation from Latin means “defilement of relic”. Existing electoral technologies actually desecrate the sacred belief of ordinary voters in honest sizing up voting results. Therefore, each democratic state should be interested in realization of any honest elections in its territory. The words combination - “any elections” means elections of President, parliament, elections to the bodies of local self-management, elections in joint-stock companies, firms, corporations, trade unions, parties, creative unions, cooperative societies, universities, high schools, etc., that is everywhere, where the law or charter stipulates elections using voting by secret ballots. Therefore, state or region adopts the law (or the laws) about the order of realization of secret voting in its territory. In the text of the law is established that with the purpose of realization of honest elections with secret voting and exception of swindling their results, exclusively transparent secret voting technologies should be used, with this purpose all organizations and enterprises located in the territory of the state or region should obtain the license for using these transparent technologies. The state (regional) monopoly to use transparent secret voting technologies is actually announced. All firms and organizations should then buy from the state (region) the license for the right to use this technology for realization of secret voting. Thus, state or region can receive profit very quickly, actually without any expenses. Owners of the patents are ready to conclude the contract for transfer of this technology with delay of payment or with payment of certain interest from the profit from establishing monopoly for using this technology in the framework of region, state etc. For details see menu option: "Review of secret vote technologies".The authors will also be pleased to accept any sponsor's help for continuation of scientific researches for further development of transparent secret voting technologies, their distribution worldwide, and firstly, publishing the monograph “Secret voting technologies by the polling ballots”.
Patent holders are ready to conclude contracts for assignment to any natural or legal person the rights for using the patents in any country (region), or worldwide.
The authors are interested in approbation of transparent technologies in real elections to local and regional bodies of executive or legislative authority.
For such approbation the complete set of the documents with detailed description of transparent secret voting technologies can be transferred under the agreement free-of-charge.